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In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1981), Saul Kripke puts forward 
three arguments against dispositional analyses of meaning. One has to do with the 
fact that speakers are disposed to make mistakes in their use of language. Another 
has to do with the fact that speakers’ dispositions do not cover all the possible oc-
casions of use. And then there is what has come to be known as “the Normativity 
Argument”, which Kripke (1981, p. 37) summarizes thus: 
 
Suppose I do mean addition by “+”. What is the relation of this supposition 
to the question how I will respond to the problem “68 + 57”? The 
dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if “+” meant ad-
dition, then I will answer “125”. But this is not the proper account of the re-
lation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant 
addition by “+”, I will answer “125”, but that, if I intend to accord with my 
past meaning of “+”, I should answer “125”. [...] The relation of meaning 
and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. 
 
The first two arguments I discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., Guardo 2012a and 
2012b). In this paper I want to focus on the third. 
In the literature, there is a lot of debate not just about the strength of the Nor-
mativity Argument, but also about its content ‒ different commentators have giv-
en very different readings of Kripke’s remarks concerning the normativity of 
meaning and intention. Here I will set aside the exegetical issue, embracing with-
out argument what may be called “the epistemological reading” of Kripke’s re-
marks,
1
 and focus on the task of assessing its strength. In this connection, I will 
argue for two theses. The first one is that in his book Kripke discusses, even 
though he is not very explicit about it, two different, albeit related, problems ‒ one 
in the philosophy of mind and the other in the metaphysics of language (or, more 
precisely, in metasemantics) ‒ and so his whole discussion of semantic 
                                                 
1
 The epistemological reading is defended in Guardo 2014 and Zalabardo 1997. For a dif-
ferent reading see, e.g., Boghossian 2003 and 2005, Gibbard 2012, Glüer and Wikforss 
2009, Hattiangadi 2006 and 2007, Miller 2010, Whiting 2007 and 2009, and Wikforss 
2001. Note that ‒ as I explain in Guardo 2014, note 7 ‒ the epistemological reading is 
perfectly consistent with the fact that the problem Kripke discusses in his book is meta-
physical, not epistemological, in nature. Note also that the epistemological argument I as-
cribe to Kripke has been independently put forward by Wright (1989) and that, in any 
case, it is interesting in its own right and deserves, I think, to be discussed independently 
of who its proponents are. 
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dispositionalism, Normativity Argument included, should be seen as twofold in 
the very same way: there is a normativity argument against semantic 
dispositionalism in the philosophy of mind and there is another normativity argu-
ment against semantic dispositionalism in the metaphysics of language. My se-
cond, and most important, claim will then be that the Normativity Argument is 
much stronger when viewed as an argument in the philosophy of mind. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I sketch the first of the two 
problems Kripke discusses, the one in the philosophy of mind, and I describe the 
corresponding form of semantic dispositionalism. In section 2, I discuss the nor-
mativity argument against this semantic dispositionalism and argue that it is quite 
a strong argument. In section 3, I turn to the problem in the metaphysics of lan-
guage. Finally, in section 4, I discuss the normativity argument against semantic 
dispositionalism in the metaphysics of language and show that it is much weaker 
than its companion in the philosophy of mind. 
 
1. Semantic Dispositionalism in the Philosophy of Mind 
When, talking about game theory, I utter the name “Schelling”, I refer to Thomas 
Crombie Schelling, the American economist ‒ not to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
von Schelling, the German idealist. When I use the word “red”, I refer to a certain 
class of shades. And when I say that 68 + 57 = 125, by “+” I mean the addition 
function. But what does this referring, this meaning amount to? The nature of this 
prima facie unproblematic mental state is actually quite elusive and much of Witt-
genstein on Rules and Private Language is devoted to a discussion of the, no 
doubt somewhat incredible, idea that there is no such thing. 
Take the case of “+”. We all think that by this symbol we mean the addition 
function; but what does this meaning addition ‒ rather than some quaddition func-
tion which diverges from addition only when at least one of its arguments is au-
thentically huge ‒ consist in? The difference cannot be a matter of the way I an-
swer particular “+” problems, for the “+” problems I am presented with never in-
volve really huge numbers, and addition and quaddition diverge only when we get 
to such numbers. Nor can we answer the challenge by trying to argue that at some 
point I must have entertained thoughts that fit addition but not quaddition, for 
such thoughts would no doubt involve language, and so the challenge would have 
just been moved from the case of “+” to that of the other words occurring in the 
thought in question ‒ the recursive definition of addition fits addition but not 
quaddition, but only if by “S” I mean the successor function, and what does this 
meaning the successor function (rather than some other function which diverges 
from it only for huge arguments) consist in? 
Such questions need to be answered. Saying that there is no difference between 
meaning addition and meaning quaddition is tantamount to admitting that there is 
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no such thing as meaning addition. And if there is no difference between meaning 
addition and meaning quaddition, then there is no difference between meaning 
green and meaning grue (where past objects were grue if and only if they were 
green while present objects are grue if and only if they are blue), and so on. 
Therefore, saying that there is no difference between meaning addition and mean-
ing quaddition is saying that there is no such thing as meaning, period. 
 
Dispositions seem to many to provide the most natural answer to this kind of 
question. The reason why I mean addition and not quaddition is that my disposi-
tions track the former, not the latter. 
Let us say, for concreteness’ sake, that quaddition starts to diverge from addi-
tion when at least one of its arguments is greater than or equal to 1,000,000; when 
that is the case, the result of a quaddition is always 5. And let us also assume that I 
have never been presented with “+” problems involving arguments greater than 
999,999. That does not mean that I do not have the disposition to answer 
“1,000,002” if asked about “1,000,001 + 1”.2 
 
Here is how Kripke (1981, pp. 22-23) introduces semantic dispositionalism: 
 
To mean addition by “+” is to be disposed, when asked for any sum “x + y”, 
to give the sum of x and y as the answer […]; to mean quus is to be dis-
posed, when queried about any arguments, to respond with their quum […]. 
True, my actual thoughts and responses in the past do not differentiate be-
tween the plus and the quus hypotheses; but, even in the past, there were 
dispositional facts about me that did make such a differentiation. 
 
And here is a more careful characterization of the view: 
 
[…] the simple dispositional analysis […] gives a criterion that will tell me 
what number theoretic function φ I mean by a binary function symbol “f”, 
namely: the referent φ of “f” is that unique binary function φ such that I am 
disposed, if queried about “f(m, n)”, where “m” and “n” are numerals denot-
ing particular numbers m and n, to reply “p”, where “p” is a numeral denot-
ing φ(m, n) (Kripke 1981, p. 26). 
 
                                                 
2
 One could, of course, question the notion that, in the case of “+” problems with really 
huge arguments, I have the disposition to answer with their sum. This is the point of the 
second of Kripke’s three arguments. For a promising attempt to deal with it see Warren 
forthcoming. 
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So much for the introductory remarks. Let us now turn to the normativity ar-
gument that Kripke puts forward against this first form of semantic 
dispositionalism. 
 
2. The Normativity Argument in the Philosophy of Mind 
Kripke’s normativity argument against the semantic dispositionalism of the previ-
ous section is concisely stated in the following passage: 
 
[…] ““125” is the response you are disposed to give, and […] it would also 
have been your response in the past”. Well and good, I know that “125” is 
the response I am disposed to give […], and maybe it is helpful to be told 
[…] that I would have given the same response in the past. How does any of 
this indicate that […] “125” was an answer justified […], rather than a mere 
jack-in-the-box unjustified and arbitrary response? Am I supposed to justify 
my present belief that I meant addition […], and hence should answer 
“125”, in terms of a hypothesis about my past dispositions? (Do I record and 
investigate the past physiology of my brain?) (Kripke 1981, p. 23). 
 
Let me unpack the passage a little bit. 
From a logical point of view, the argument starts with the assumption that it is 
a conceptual truth about meaning that one’s meaning a certain thing by a certain 
word can be used to justify their use of that word ‒ and that when one justifies 
their use of a given word in terms of what they meant, the process takes a certain 
characteristic form; for lack of a better term, I will say that the justifications in 
question are “non-hypothetical”.3 
Here is an example of what Kripke has in mind. Let us suppose that, during a 
conversation, I say that analytic philosophers have a great deal of respect for 
Schelling’s work and that, taking me to be speaking of the German idealist, you 
comment that you have never had that impression. I realize that there has been a 
misunderstanding, and I clarify that I was not referring to the German idealist, but 
to the American economist. My meaning the American economist can be used to 
                                                 
3
 In Guardo 2014 I construed this first part of Kripke’s argument in a slightly different 
way. According to the reading defended in that article, that when one justifies their use of 
a given word in terms of what they meant, the justifications in question are non-
hypothetical is deduced from the “unhesitating” character of our linguistic behavior ‒ 
while here that is just assumed, without argument. I take the reconstruction I focus on in 
this paper to be preferable both from an exegetical and a philosophical point of view. 
That being said, none of this matters that much, since (as I note below and explain a bit 
more in detail in Guardo 2014) Kripke’s emphasis on the notion of justification is some-
what of a red herring. 
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justify my claim that analytic philosophers have a great deal of respect for Schel-
ling’s work. And the justification process is especially straightforward; it does not 
rely on hypotheses but, rather, on what seems to be a form of non-inferential 
knowledge of my mental states: when I say something, I non-inferentially know 
what I mean, and I can use this non-inferential knowledge to justify my utteranc-
es. 
But if it is a conceptual truth about meaning that one can justify their use of a 
certain word by means of their non-inferential knowledge of what they meant, 
then it is clear that a dispositional analysis of meaning can work only if it can ac-
count for such non-inferential knowledge, i.e. only if speakers have non-
inferential knowledge of their linguistic dispositions. But, as a matter of fact, 
speakers do not have such knowledge. And so semantic dispositionalism is bound 
to fail. 
 
I take this to be an extremely strong argument against the very notion that the 
mental state of meaning can be made sense of in terms of dispositions. The first, 
conceptual, step of the argument is virtually impossible to deny, especially when 
one realizes that it is even more straightforward than Kripke makes it out to be. 
After all, here the point is that semantic dispositionalists must make sense of the 
fact that we all have non-inferential access to what we mean; Kripke introduces 
this idea by focusing on the role that this access plays in our justificatory practic-
es, but one does not have to go about it that way: that we non-inferentially know 
what we mean is quite clear in itself, even independently of this knowledge’s role 
in our justificatory practices. 
The argument’s second step is quite solid, too. If dispositionalism were true, 
my non-inferentially knowing that I mean addition would require me to non-
inferentially know, for any pair of huge numbers M and N, that I am disposed to 
answer with their sum if asked about “M + N”. And that is a knowledge which I 
most definitely do not have. 
Note that what I am taking to be clear is not that it is not the case that I know, 
for any pair of huge numbers M and N, that I am disposed to answer with their 
sum if asked about “M + N”. This I may well know ‒ let us say I can deduce it, 
with reasonable confidence, from the answers I do give to more manageable “+” 
problems. What I believe is clear is only that, if I do have such knowledge, it is 
inferential in nature. 
Nor am I assuming that it is impossible for me to have the non-inferential 
knowledge in question. No doubt there are possible worlds in which I do have 
non-inferential access, down to the tiniest detail, to my current brain states, and 
hence to my linguistic dispositions. What I am assuming is just that, as a matter of 
fact, I do not have such knowledge. This is all that needs to be assumed in order 
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for the argument to go through, since its point is that semantic dispositionalism 
cannot make sense of the fact that I have non-inferential access to what I mean, in 
this world.
4
 
The Normativity Argument, viewed as an argument in the philosophy of mind, 
is, indeed, quite straightforward. In a certain sense, it comes down to the claim 
that semantic dispositionalism “[…] threatens […] to make a total mystery of the 
phenomenon of non-inferential, first-personal knowledge of past and present 
meanings […]” (Wright 1989, p. 175). In order to resist it, one should show either 
that this is not a real phenomenon or that, contrary appearances notwithstanding, a 
dispositional analysis can account for it. The first strategy looks utterly desperate,
5
 
while the second is inconsistent with what seem to be rather uncontroversial facts 
about our knowledge of our dispositions. 
 
3. Semantic Dispositionalism in the Metaphysics of Language 
In this section I turn to the first of the two theses I want to argue for, namely that 
in his book Kripke discusses two different problems, one in the philosophy of 
mind and the other in the metaphysics of language, and so all he says about se-
mantic dispositionalism, Normativity Argument included, should be seen as two-
fold in the very same way.
6
 
 
Let us start by coming back to the way I introduced the problem of meaning in 
the philosophy of mind. Following Kripke, I tried to show that the notion of 
meaning something by a sign is problematic by calling attention to the fact that it 
is not clear how to make sense of the difference between meaning addition and 
meaning quaddition, where quaddition was assumed to be a function which di-
verges from addition only when at least one of its arguments is authentically huge. 
Kripke defines quaddition in a slightly different way: he stipulates quaddition to 
diverge from addition as soon as at least one of its arguments is greater than or 
equal to 57. However, Kripke also assumes that we have never been presented 
with “+” problems involving arguments greater than 56, so the difference between 
                                                 
4
 For a more in-depth discussion of this second part of Kripke’s argument see Guardo 
2014. 
5
 Of course, a meaning skeptic can deny the reality of “the phenomenon of non-
inferential, first-personal knowledge of past and present meanings” on the basis of the 
fact that, in their view, there is no such thing as meaning. However, such a move is clear-
ly unavailable to the dispositionalist, whose goal is to vindicate our intuitions concerning 
this mental state. 
6
 Of course, the problem in the metaphysics of language I am about to sketch is interest-
ing, and deserving of discussion, in its own right ‒ independently of whether Kripke real-
ly had it in mind or not. 
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his definition and mine is superficial; in both cases, quaddition is defined in such 
a way that the answers we gave to the “+” problems we have been presented with 
were consistent with both addition and quaddition. Now let me ask a question: 
why is this important? Why does it matter that our answers to the “+” problems 
we have been presented with are compatible with both functions? 
The answer to this question is rather obvious: Kripke wants to build a case in 
which it is clear that the difference between meaning addition and meaning 
quaddition cannot be made sense of in terms of overt behavior, i.e. in terms of the 
answers we give to the “+” problems we are actually presented with. But, as clear 
as it is that this is what he has in mind, a little reflection is more than enough to 
see that Kripke’s worry here does not make much sense. Overt behavior is just not 
the kind of thing a mental state can be identified with. Saying that my meaning 
addition by “+” consists in my giving (as opposed to my being disposed to give) 
certain answers to certain problems is not explaining what that mental state 
amounts to; it is saying that there is no such thing as meaning something by a 
sign, and then trying to substitute that concept with something else. 
So now the question is: how is it that Kripke did not realize that? The answer 
is, I think, that while he was working on Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Lan-
guage Kripke had in mind, besides the problem I described earlier, another one, 
too. The two problems are related, and most of the time what holds with regard to 
the first problem holds in the case of the second one, too (and vice versa). There-
fore, Kripke does not take the trouble to explicitly distinguish between them. But 
the two problems are distinct nonetheless, and sometimes what makes sense with 
regard to one does not make sense with regard to the other. And so not distin-
guishing between them may lead one to worry about things that need not be wor-
ried about. What I described in the previous two paragraphs is just one such case. 
But what is this other problem that Kripke had in mind? As I have already 
hinted, it is a problem in the metaphysics of language. More precisely, it is the 
problem of explaining what determines the reference of a word.
7
 What makes it 
the case that the name “Ludwig Wittgenstein” denotes a certain Austrian philoso-
pher? What makes it the case that the predicate “being a philosopher” refers to the 
class of individuals which, as a matter of fact, it does refer to? And what makes it 
the case that “+” refers to the addition function, and not to quaddition?8 
                                                 
7
 In Guardo 2018 I described this second problem in a slightly different way. I now think 
that that formulation is less than optimal and, therefore, in this paper I decided to drop it 
and substitute it with the one just given. 
8
 One may wonder how Kripke could fail to clearly distinguish this problem from the one 
described in section 1. The answer is, I think, that both problems can be rephrased in 
terms of correctness, and when phrased that way it is indeed quite easy to mistake one for 
the other. That the concept of reference has a normative dimension (and so the problem of 
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Kripke’s two problems are, of course, related (their relationship will look espe-
cially close if one believes that the reference of a word depends on what people 
usually mean by it). But they are two distinct problems nonetheless. One has to do 
with the nature of a certain mental state, the other has to do with the relationship 
between linguistic expressions and entities in the world. 
It is because they are distinct problems that, sometimes, what does not make 
sense in the case of one does make at least some sense in that of the other. In the 
case of the problem of explaining the nature of the mental state of meaning some-
thing by a sign, any reference to overt behavior can be discarded out of hand as 
clearly irrelevant. But in the case of the problem of explaining what makes it the 
case that a word refers to what it refers to, overt behavior seems to be at least part 
of the solution: granted, taken by itself, past usage does not show that “+” does 
not refer to quaddition; but at least it rules out other functions, which diverge from 
addition also with regard to pairs of smaller arguments ‒ or at least so it seems.9, 10 
 
                                                                                                                                     
explaining what determines the reference of a word can be rephrased in terms of correct-
ness) is rather obvious: saying that “being a philosopher” refers to a certain class of indi-
viduals is saying that that predicate is applied correctly if and only if it is applied to a 
member of that class. The availability of a formulation in terms of correctness is some-
what less apparent in the case of the problem of the nature of the mental state of meaning 
something by a sign, for such a formulation involves the semi-technical notion of met-
alinguistic correctness. That being said, the idea is rather easy to get. If by “+” I have al-
ways meant quaddition, there is a sense ‒ what Kripke calls the “metalinguistic” sense ‒ 
in which for me it is correct to answer “5” if asked about “1,000,001 + 1”: “5” is the cor-
rect answer in the sense that “+”, as I intended to use that symbol in the past, denoted a 
function which, when applied to the numbers I called “1,000,001” and “1”, yields the 
value 5. And so the problem of explaining what makes it the case that by “+” I mean ad-
dition (and not quaddition) can be seen as the problem of explaining what makes it the 
case that I should answer “1,000,002” (and not “5”) if asked for “1,000,001 + 1”. 
9
 As a matter of fact, in this case appearances are misleading, for reasons I explain in 
Guardo 2012b and elsewhere. That being said, nothing of importance hinges on this point 
here. 
10
 Some may take the upshot of the foregoing to be not that Kripke was interested in two 
distinct (and yet related) problems, but that the problem Kripke was really interested in is 
not the one he seems to be interested in ‒ but, rather, the one in the metaphysics of lan-
guage I have just sketched. I believe that such a conclusion would be too strong. Kripke is 
quite clearly interested in the nature of the mental state of meaning, too. In fact, one of 
the things that makes it clear is his use of the Normativity Argument ‒ which is very 
strong when viewed as an argument in the philosophy of mind but, as I am about to ar-
gue, rather weak as an argument in the metaphysics of language. 
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Just as the problem Kripke is interested in is actually two problems, it is im-
portant to recognize that there are two semantic dispositionalisms, one in the phi-
losophy of mind and one in the metaphysics of language. In the philosophy of 
mind, semantic dispositionalism is the thesis that what makes it the case that I 
mean, say, addition by “+” is that I have certain dispositions, and not others ‒ I 
have addition-tracking, not quaddition-tracking, dispositions. In the metaphysics 
of language, on the other hand, to be a semantic dispositionalist is to have a cer-
tain view of what makes it the case that a word refers to what it refers to ‒ “+” 
denotes the addition function because it is that function which is tracked by the 
speakers’ dispositions concerning the use of that symbol. 
And just as there are two semantic dispositionalisms, one can try to put forward 
a normativity argument both in the philosophy of mind and in the metaphysics of 
language. In section 2, I argued that, in the philosophy of mind, normativity con-
siderations are extremely effective. In the next section, I will try to show that in 
the metaphysics of language the situation is completely different. 
 
4. The Normativity Argument in the Metaphysics of Language 
According to the epistemological reading I am assuming here, the Normativity 
Argument is epistemological in nature. The argument gets called “Normativity 
Argument” because it makes use of the notion of justification, which is normative, 
but its focus on our justificatory practices is just a means to call attention to an 
epistemological point, and in fact the argument can be rephrased without making 
any mention of justifications ‒ so that “Normativity Argument” is really some-
thing of a misnomer. 
In the philosophy of mind, focusing on the epistemological core of the argu-
ment ‒ setting aside all talk of justifications ‒ gets us something like this: it is a 
fact that we have direct access to (non-inferential knowledge of) what we mean by 
our words; we do not have, however, any such access to our linguistic disposi-
tions; therefore, dispositional analyses of meaning cannot account for the episte-
mology of this mental state, and so they can be discarded out of hand. 
To me, this looks like a very strong argument. But can such considerations be 
generalized to the case of semantic dispositionalism in the metaphysics of lan-
guage? Well, in the metaphysics of language, semantic dispositionalism is the 
view that what makes it the case that a word refers to what it refers to are the 
speakers’ dispositions. Therefore, here, in order to get off the ground, the Norma-
tivity Argument would need to call attention to some feature of our epistemic rela-
tionship with facts about reference ‒ and, relatedly, of our knowledge of a word’s 
reference ‒ that semantic dispositionalism cannot make sense of. What we need is 
an asymmetry between our knowledge of a word’s reference, our semantic com-
petence, and our knowledge of the speakers’ dispositions. Hence, the issue of the 
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effectiveness of “normative” considerations against semantic dispositionalism in 
the metaphysics of language comes down to a very simple question: is such an 
asymmetry anywhere to be found? 
 
To the extent that I can make sense of the notion of reference, it seems to me 
that the character of our epistemic relationship to the relevant facts is perfectly 
consistent with the idea that those facts are facts about the speakers’ dispositions. 
The mental state of meaning a certain thing by a certain word is clearly a con-
scious state (a state with a phenomenal component), to which we have direct, non-
inferential access. Facts about the reference of linguistic expressions, though, are 
not like that. Granted, that “+” refers to addition is something I am extremely con-
fident about. It may even be said that that is something I am certain of. But the 
very same degree of confidence I have in the fact that my own and my fellow 
speakers’ dispositions concerning “+” track addition, and not some other 
quaddition-like function. Therefore, it seems that nothing about the nature of our 
epistemic access to facts about reference tells against the idea that these facts are 
really facts concerning how we are disposed to use the words of our language. 
One might try to salvage the argument by building on the fact that, in its origi-
nal version, the Normativity Argument made use of the concept of justification. 
Of course, we have seen that, in the case of the version of the argument Kripke 
runs in the philosophy of mind, any mention of justifications can be removed 
without in any way weakening the argument. But maybe things are different when 
we turn to the metaphysics of language; maybe here the reference to our justifica-
tory practices is essential. 
Prima facie, this is an interesting suggestion. When one realizes that the point 
of the Normativity Argument is epistemological, Kripke’s emphasis on the notion 
of justification starts to look rather strange. But if it were to turn out that in the 
case of the metaphysics of language the argument requires that concept, then the 
way Kripke builds it would make much more sense. That being said, I do not see 
how a focus on our justificatory practices could provide the kind of asymmetry we 
are after. And so my conclusion is that the Normativity Argument is not a serious 
threat to semantic dispositionalism in the metaphysics of language. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Kripke took the Normativity Argument to show not just that semantic 
dispositionalism is false, but that it is clearly false, that nobody in their right mind 
could take seriously such a blatantly inadequate account of meaning. The standard 
interpretation of the Normativity Argument ‒ according to which the point of the 
argument is that while meaning a certain thing by a certain word entails categori-
cal oughts, having certain dispositions does not ‒ makes Kripke’s assessment of 
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the strength of his argument look overly optimistic.
11
 After all, that meaning a cer-
tain thing by a certain word entails categorical oughts is far from uncontrover-
sial.
12
 On the other hand, the epistemological reading I sketched in section 2 
makes, I think, perfect sense of Kripke’s view of the dialectic ‒ since the argu-
ment described in that section is indeed a very strong one. But by vindicating 
Kripke’s assessment of the merits of the Normativity Argument the epistemologi-
cal reading raises a worry: if it is true that nobody in their right mind could take 
seriously such a blatantly inadequate account of meaning as semantic 
dispositionalism, how is it that among the ranks of semantic dispositionalists we 
find philosophers such as (to name just a few) Simon Blackburn (1984), John Heil 
and Charlie Martin (1998), Fred Dretske (1981), and Jerry Fodor (1990)? 
The two theses I have argued for in the previous two sections can, I think, help 
answer such worries. As shown in section 3, the label “semantic dispositionalism” 
is ambiguous. It may refer to the view in the philosophy of mind which is the pri-
mary target of Kripke’s normativity considerations, but it may also refer to a the-
sis in the metaphysics of language. And, as I have argued in section 4, when 
viewed as an argument against the latter thesis the Normativity Argument is quite 
weak. Hence, it may be that the reason why Blackburn, Dretske, Fodor, etc found 
semantic dispositionalism attractive is that what they had in mind was, at least to 
some extent, not the view in the philosophy of mind, which is indeed blatantly in-
adequate, but that in the metaphysics of language.
13
 
                                                 
11
 For this reading see the works cited in note 1. 
12
 See, e.g., Boghossian 2003 and 2005, Glüer and Wikforss 2009, Hattiangadi 2006 and 
2007, and Wikforss 2001. 
13
 Of course, the two semantic dispositionalisms are, as I have already noted, related; and 
most philosophers (Kripke in primis) do not distinguish clearly between them. Therefore, 
it does not make much sense to pretend that there is a clear-cut distinction between hav-
ing in mind the view in the metaphysics of language and having in mind that in the phi-
losophy of mind. 
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